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Key messages
• Lockdown strategies must consider governance constraints 
that can dangerously limit the emergency response to 
Covid-19, risking both lives and livelihoods
• The intensity of lockdowns depends on two critical 
interdependent variables: a feasible testing and treatment 
strategy for that context which in turn has to take into account 
the organisational capacity to scale up responses
 • Governance and corruption related constraints that can hinder 
scaling up can be mitigated with an innovative anti-corruption 
approach involving mobilisation of multiple providers for each 
delivery goal, and not just relying on one system such as the 
public health system
 • The incentives generated to work for a national emergency 
can provide a framework for cooperation and to deliver cost-
effective rapid results particularly if the strategy scales up 
providers who perform better.
• With lockdowns used to scale up feasible testing and 
treatment strategies, less restrictive lockdowns become 
possible minimising the joint effects of disease deaths and the 
severe effects of economic deprivation
What is ACE?
The Anti-Corruption Evidence 
(ACE) research consortium takes 
an innovative approach to anti-
corruption policy and practice. 
Working with a multi-country 
coalition of 12 partners over five 
years, ACE is responding to the 
serious challenges facing people and 
economies affected by corruption 
by generating evidence that makes 
anti-corruption real and using those 
findings to help policymakers, 
business and civil society adopt new, 
feasible, high-impact strategies to 
tackle corruption.
Anti-Corruption Evidence 





Coronavirus curfew in the city of 
Lagos, Nigeria on April 02, 2020 
(Credit: Vanessa Ade-Anadolu agency)
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The COVID-19 crisis could be with us for at least 18 
months, with lockdowns relaxed or tightened at 
intervals. It will only end when we have an effective 
treatment or vaccine, or enough people are infected 
and recover to achieve herd immunity (though the 
human cost of this would be high). Meanwhile, striking 
the right balance between lockdowns and relaxations 
is now a major concern for poor countries. As Heather 
Marquette has noted , we have to get this right. 
Lockdowns aim to manage the flow of patients into 
health facilities by slowing disease transmission, 
but the consequences have been devastating in 
developing countries. Their economies are already 
poor, with limited safety nets for people out of work, 
while their health services cannot cope with any influx 
of extra patients. 
No lockdown strategy can be determined without 
considering the elephant in the room: the governance 
constraints that limit the emergency expansion of 
basic COVID-19 testing and treatment facilities. If we 
don’t, the trade-offs will be dire. Even if developing 
countries could find emergency funds, governance 
weaknesses and corruption may constrain the 
emergency scale-up demanded by COVID-19. Existing 
governance and corruption problems will become 
more crippling if countries have to expand their health 
capacity at speed. These problems must be addressed 
if lockdowns are going to do their job: slowing the 
transmission of disease to the point where some 
relaxation is possible, while reducing the loss of life.
Lockdowns buy us time. But 
what should we do with it?
As Figure 1 shows, deaths from COVID-19 depend on 
the trade-offs implicit in the ‘lockdown strategy’. If the 
lockdown is too loose, existing health facilities may 
be unable to cope with the rate of infections, leading 
to many avoidable deaths. If the restrictions are too 
tight and prolonged, however, many deaths may 
be caused by the impact of economic deprivation. 
Figure 1: Trade-offs in the COVID-19 response
Source: The authors
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Evidence-based responses are needed to use the time 
provided by lockdowns to improve these trade-offs. 
This is because over time, these trade-offs depend on 
developing treatment capacity during the ‘breathing 
space’ provided by each lockdown. If testing and 
treatment capacity does not expand during lockdowns, 
the eventual opening up will mean a new surge of 
deaths resulting from infection and poor treatment. And 
any subsequent lockdowns will just repeat the cycle. For 
a lockdown strategy to be feasible and actually reduce 
deaths, governments must use this time to improve 
their COVID-19 treatment capacity. In many countries, 
however, politics and governance get in the way. 
Pre-existing sectarian prejudices and fake news 
have affected responses in large countries like India 
and Nigeria, while the determination to show that 
everything is under control is distorting data in some 
other countries. There is evidence that developing 
countries with experiences of previous epidemics, 
especially in Africa, have better organisational 
responses. Evidence from most developing countries 
shows that many lives may be pushed to the edge if the 
lockdown strategy is calibrated incorrectly, particularly 
if the effects on the poor are ignored. But no amount of 
calibration will help if there are no good choices to be 
made, and nothing is done to improve these choices.
An effective response must address the two other 
variables shown in Figure 1 that enable more sustainable 
lockdown strategies and save more lives: the strategies 
for feasible treatment and scaling up. 
Determining the feasible 
treatment strategy
This refers to the tests, treatments, quarantine 
arrangements, and equipment for health workers that 
the health system can feasibly deliver with loans from 
international financial institutions, grants from donors 
and their own resources. It is a medical issue, but also 
depends on the country’s economic, organizational 
and professional capabilities. Being over-ambitious in 
selecting the desirable mix of test and treatment can 
be as deadly as being too lax. The selected mix should 
be good enough to save lives but not so good that it is 
impossible to deliver. And it should be possible to scale 
up at speed.
Scaling-up capacity
The judgement on the treatment mix is therefore tied 
to the most critical variable from a policy perspective: 
how to scale up capacity as fast as possible. Long-
standing governance and corruption problems can 
become severe constraints on emergency scale-up. 
Pumping new resources through weak systems on an 
emergency basis can mean significant wastage as a 
result of bureaucracy, inefficiency and corruption. 
The cost of scaling up particular types of testing, 
treatment, and quarantine facilities depends on the 
capabilities of the agencies delivering the expansion 
and their internal leakages and inefficiencies. For 
example, the rapid increase of quarantine beds 
through ‘normal’ procurement processes in public 
healthcare facilities may trigger huge increases in 
unit costs in developing countries that have more 
corrupt healthcare systems. The true cost of an extra 
bed or testing kit includes not just the direct cost 
but the cost of resource wastage and corruption 
in the organization delivering it. Sadly, evidence is 
emerging that corruption becomes ‘easier’ in a crisis 
when money has to be spent quickly to procure 
emergency material.
Standard anti-corruption measures, like linking new 
lending to reform measures, are even less likely to 
provide immediate results in such conditions, though 
the experience of what a weak health system can do 
may well improve the chances of reform over time. 
Three lockdown strategies
If governance and corruption failures prevent the 
scaling-up of capacity, lockdowns have to be harsh to 
stop the uncontrollable spread of disease, inflicting 
enormous hardships on poor people without offering 
any hope of immediate respite. These lockdowns 
may well break down because of deprivation, 
allowing the disease to re-emerge with devastating 
consequences and further harsh lockdowns. The 
only answer here is to ramp up cash transfers and 
other poverty mitigation strategies (which should 
happen anyway). But transfers alone are unlikely to 
address deprivation in poor countries and may miss 
many people. 
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Figure 2, adapted from Marquette and Evans, plots 
the numbers infected in each period under different 
lockdown strategies (red line in top half) and the 
associated economic deprivation (bottom half).  
COVID-19 deaths depend on the gap between the 
infected number line and health system capacity. 
Mortality caused by economic deprivation depends 
on the total number of people falling into deprivation 
and its intensity in each cycle. 
In Lockdown 1, emergency measures are harsh 
because treatment facilities are limited. Although 
the infection curve is flattened, the health system 
cannot cope with the number of infected people and 
many, if not most, people are affected by economic 
deprivation. While infections may be contained, 
temporarily, the negative indirect impacts (economic 
deprivation, indirect morbidity, and mortality) 
may outweigh the positive effects of temporary 
containment. And high levels of deprivation mean the 
strategy is not sustainable: harsh lockdowns will be 
followed by unsustainable relaxation.
1 Thanks to Hamsi Evans for the artwork and Peter Evans for his inputs.
The looser strategy shown in Lockdown 2 is possible 
if response challenges have been addressed and 
COVID-19 testing and treatment capacities have 
improved. Emergency restrictions can now be 
more cautious and targeted, and the infection 
curve is flattened to within the (higher) capacity of 
the improved health system while allowing more 
economic activity. Fewer people face economic 
deprivation and have more chance of being reached 
by anti-poverty measures. The direct and indirect 
impacts of the lockdown produce a better outcome 
than in Lockdown 1. 
If testing and treatment capacities can be scaled up 
even further, we can imagine Lockdown 3, which 
strikes a better balance between direct health effects 
and indirect economic deprivation. This lockdown 
can be even more targeted and limited. As well as 
resulting in better overall outcomes, it may also be 
more sustainable over the many months or years that 
the virus remains a threat as economic deprivation is 
less likely to spiral out of control. 
Figure 2: Three lockdowns
Source: Adapted from Marquette and Evans1.
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A possible way forward
Governance and corruption are critical constraint that 
may prevent many societies moving to sustainable 
lockdowns. A rapid scaling up through established 
processes may be too slow and too costly. Mobilising 
multiple organisations may be a feasible, if temporary, 
anti-corruption strategy in an emergency. 
Fortunately, health systems are not uniformly weak at 
all levels and across all types of agencies. The public 
health system may have hospitals and clinics at federal, 
provincial and local levels with different capabilities, 
there may be private health providers of different types, 
NGOs may be providing some health services and so on. 
Each type of provider has strengths and weaknesses in 
scaling up specific services. 
A feasible anti-corruption strategy in an emergency 
may, therefore, be to coordinate the provision of 
different elements of the COVID-19 treatment strategy 
using different types of delivery agencies, recognizing 
their strengths and weaknesses, to achieve the most 
cost-effective and fastest possible scaling up. The point 
is not to try and remove all corruption and governance 
failures but to reduce the cost of corruption during the 
emergency to allow a rapid scaling up. This requires an 
adaptive and inclusive emergency response strategy 
that can start with trials and rapidly scale up providers 
based on their efficacy in actually delivering under 
emergency conditions. 
In normal times, innovation can face strong resistance 
from incumbents. But in times of war, and COVID-19 
feels like that in many countries, unusual measures may 
be possible on a temporary basis. 
It is not necessary to predict which organizations are 
better at what. The mobilization of multiple providers for 
each delivery goal can generate incentives to cooperate 
and strive to deliver the fastest and most cost-effective 
results, particularly if the strategy scales up the providers 
who perform better, and if the strategy is presented to 
the public as a national emergency response. 
The response to developing testing capacity in the UK 
is one example, with multiple agencies, universities, 
the private sector and even the army mobilized to 
deliver a rapid increase in testing capabilities. This 
was not an anti-corruption measure, but a strategy to 
accelerate delivery. A similar approach in developing 
countries could temporarily mitigate corruption and 
low capacity by involving public and private and NGO 
actors, hospitals, clinics and testing facilities, enabling 
scale up on the basis of revealed competence in trials. 
A SOAS-ACE blog on Uganda suggested that even the 
smallest private drug shops and clinics could play a role 
in a coordinated strategy. 
The best outcome for a developing country is where out-
of-the-box approaches bypass established corruption 
and governance problems to scale up testing and 
treatment facilities in this unprecedented emergency, 
enabling the least restrictive lockdowns on an ongoing 
basis. In this scenario, a lockdown is a helpful tool and 
subsequent lockdowns become more sustainable. 
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